We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to extend the classical models of Mussa and Rosen and Baron and Myerson for arbitrary distributions. JEL Classification: D44
Introduction
In this paper we consider optimal auctions in an independent private values model. Our first objective is to characterize the optimal auction for general distributions. That is, distributions that may have jumps, that are not absolutely continuous. The classical paper, Myerson (1981) , proves existence and characterize the optimal auction if the distribution of types/valuations of each bidder i has a density that is
We thank the comments of Carlos da Costa, Flavio Menezes, Frank Page, seminar participants at FGV-EPGE and Vienna University and conference participants at CODE-2007, SAET07 and JPET08. Monteiro acknowledges the financial support of Edital Universal 02/06, CNPq and Capes-Cofecub 468/04. Benar acknowledges the financial support of CNPq 1 Corresponding author, email address: pklm@fgv.br. continuous, strictly positive on its support, the interval [a i , b i ]. Let us call this condition 2 (M). This condition is also used in Riley and Samuelson (1981) . They consider a symmetrical model and look for an optimal mechanism amongst those symmetrical ones that gives the object to the bidder with the highest type. They conclude that the usual auctions (like a first-price sealed bid auction) are optimal if a reserve price is properly chosen. Myerson's paper reaches the most general result under condition (M). He shows that the optimal auction is a Vickrey's type auction: what you pay when you win does not depend on your type but only on the other's bidders types. In Myerson's paper a key role is played by the virtual valuation of bidder i given by J i (x i ) = x i − 1−F i (x i ) f i (x i ) . If the virtual valuation is increasing, the object is delivered to bidder i if J i (x i ) ≥ 0 and J i (x i ) > J j x j for all bidders j = i. If the virtual valuation is not increasing, Myerson obtains a surrogate, J i , which is increasing and replaces J i in the allocation rule.
A distribution that satisfies condition (M) is continuous and strictly increasing.
However it is not difficult -indeed it is quite common -to find non-pathological meaningful examples of valuations that do not satisfy (M). Let us mention a few simple examples: a) Suppose that the population of an economy is divided in two groups of equal size. In one group the distribution of types is uniform [0, 1]. In the other group the distribution of types is uniform in [2, 3] . In this economy the distribution of types has support [0, 1] ∪ [2, 3] . The density the distribution in this case is null in (1, 2); b) Suppose again that the population is divided in two groups. The highest preference group has utility u = 1 and is of size 1/2. The other group has preferences u ∈ [0, 1) with an uniform distribution. Thus the distribution of valuation u has a jump of size 1/2 at u = 1. Alternatively we might think that the types u ∈ [0, 2] is uniformly distributed. But the object at sale gives utility at most 1. Thus the valuation V i (u) = min {u, 1}. In this case the distribution has a jump at valuation V i = 1 as well. c) In Bose and Daripa (2008) they need to find the optimal auction for a distribution that has a density in an interval [v, v] is constant in [v, v h ) and then has a jump at v h . d) On a more conceptual streak, the set of types may be specified by the realization of a family of random variables (i.e. the bidder information set) and therefore the set of types will have many gaps. Whenever there is a gap the density must be null at those gaps (as in (a) above).
It is a growing concern about what we can say for a general set of types. For example Che and Gale (2006) consider revenue equivalence for arbitrary set of types. Suppose the set of types is not an interval. Is there an optimal auction? If there 2 That is a distribution G satisfies the condition (M) if G has a continuous strictly positive density g :
is one, can we characterize the optimal auction? Since bidders and the seller only care about expected utilities, it is quite intuitive that what matters is the distribution. Thus two sets of types that generate the same distribution are equivalent. That is, for optimality 3 the concern for arbitrary types translates into a concern about arbitrary distributions.
It goes without saying that the more general a result the harder is to characterize the solution. Thus Myerson (1981) was fortunate in proving existence through characterizing the optimal auction. On the other hand the more general optimal auction existence result is Page (1998) . However due to its generality it is quite difficult to be more explicit about the properties of the optimal mechanism. In this paper we want to characterize the optimal auction for a general distribution. It would be specially nice if this characterization is similar to Myerson's virtual valuation characterization. This is what we do and we will need a new concept: the generalized convex hull. To motivate our solution recall how the virtual valuation J i of a given bidder i is constructed. First an auxiliary function is defined:
If J i is increasing this function is convex. In general we consider G : [0, 1] → R the convex hull of H. Define g (q) = G + (q) the right-hand derivative of G. This always exists. i (q) may be empty. Another difficulty is that when we take the derivative of the convex hull it is with respect to Lebesgue's measure and this may not be well tailored to the discontinuities of F i . It is necessary to be judicious. How to do this is the second objective of our paper and our main technical contribution. The convex hull of H being a convex function, is the supremum of the family of linear function q → α + βq that are below H. The generalized convex hull will not, in general, be a convex function. But it will be defined as the supremum of the family of functions 4 
Intuitively this is the proper analogue of the convex hull for a general distribution. We will show that the generalized convex hull, G gen so obtained can be written in the form G gen (x) = x a l (u) dF (u) and l (·) being an increasing function. It is in this sense that we say that the derivative of G gen is l (·). This derivative will be the generalized virtual valuation. This function l (·) is a general ironing for the onedimensional case. In Mussa and Rosen (1978) there is perhaps the first example of ironing in the literature. They have a function G (θ) that is at first increasing, then decreases and finally is increasing again. They call it a "wiggle." This G (θ) correspond to the virtual valuation. The key restriction is to obtain an increasingG in a way that preserves the average marginal revenue. This is accomplished by making G (θ) constant (say = q) in a certain interval (u, v) and to find u, v, q we have the equations
In Myerson (1981) the function J i is the ironing of J i . It has properties similar to (1,2). Mussa and Rosen simple approach does not handle efficiently many wrinkles (or wiggles). Myerson's approach handles any number of wrinkles (even infinitely many) under condition (M). However if there are jumps it is not clear what the ironing should be. Even existence is a problem. For example the existence of points u and v is not guaranteed since continuity is not assured due to the possible jump points of the distribution. Under this terminology we might say that the generalized virtual valuation l (·) irons not only infinitely many wrinkles but irons also a cloth that is torn at infinitely many points (i.e. the jumps of the distribution).
The generalized virtual valuation l (·) has a wide applicability. We show in the last section, that we may, without difficulty, generalize the classical nonlinear pricing model ( Mussa and Rosen (1978) ) and the regulation of a monopolist (Baron and Myerson (1982) ) for arbitrary distributions of consumer types or cost respectively.
Generalized virtual valuation
In this section a distribution F :
We suppose −∞ < a < b < ∞. Our main purpose is to define the (generalized) virtual valuation. To do this we need to define the generalized convex hull (g.c.h. for short.) Although we might formally define the g.c.h. of an arbitrary function it will not have the properties we need. Thus we restrict the definition to a case that is sufficient for our needs. Let ν be a bounded signed measure such that ν( [a, b] c ) = 0.
The set Γ is non-empty, closed and convex. If (α, β) ∈ Γ then α ≤ 0 and α + β ≤ H(b).
is the generalized convex hull of H.
Remark 1
It is well know (see Rockafellar (1970) for example) that a convex function is the supremum of the set of linear functions that are below it. Moreover the supremum of a family of linear functions is a convex function. Thus the convex hull of a function H is the supremum of the set of linear functions that are below H. If we interpret α + βF as a F linear function then it is quite natural to say that φ being the supremum of the family of F linear functions that are below H is the generalized convex hull of H.
It is clear that φ ≤ H and it is constant in (−∞, a) and in
Definition 2 (subgradient)
The number β is a subgradient of φ at x if for every z,
We denote by ∂φ (x) the set of subgradients of φ at x. The set ∂φ (x) is the subdifferential of φ at x.
It follows easily from the definition that the subdifferential of φ at x is a closed convex set. Let 5 l (x) = inf ∂φ (x) and s (x) = sup ∂φ (x). The following proposition collects elementary properties of φ. Define 6 β * := sup x<b
and β * := inf z>a
where t a := min {H(a), 0}.
Proposition 1 (basic properties)
Proof: In the appendix.
Remark 2 In particular note that item (a) implies that the subdifferential ∂φ (x) is non-empty for x ∈ (a, b). Item (b) shows that ∂φ (b) is non-empty if and only if β * < ∞. And ∂φ (a) is empty if and only if F (a) = 0 and β * = −∞.
Remark 3 Note that l(x) = s(x) only on a countable set since the family of intervals {(l (x) , s (x)) ; a ≤ x ≤ b} is pairwise disjoint. 5 It is convenient to define l(x) = −∞ if ∂φ(x) = / 0 6 We allow β * = −∞ and β * = ∞.
The following propositions shows that φ has the same continuity properties as F. The proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 2 φ is right-continuous.
Proposition 3
The left-limit φ (x−) = lim y↑x φ (y) exists. Moreover,
Having defined the g.c.h. we now define the virtual valuation.
It is well know 7 that a convex function is the integral of its subgradients. The next theorem below shows that the generalized convex hull is the integral of the virtual valuation. But before we need
Proof: The corollary 3 shows that
and choose N large enough such that
. ≤ x m = x be the extremes of the intervals 8 I i . We may write
Consider the interval x j , x j+1 , x j < x j+1 . It is contained in a unique interval I = I k for some k. If x j < z < w < x j+1 then it is true that
Now making w ↑ x j+1 and z ↓ x j we have that
Now from Proposition 4 we get,
Therefore adding termwise in j we get from (4),
We now make a decreases to a and get using right-continuity (Proposition 2):
Analogously we prove the other inequality. QED
Remark 4
Since #∂φ (x) = 1 except on a countable set it is true from the above theorem that the g.c.h. is the integral of the subgradient except that at the distribution discontinuities we do not have a choice in ∂φ (x) but to use l (x).
The next two theorems gives the key properties of the virtual valuation. 9 Just consider Q = Q − Q (a).
Theorem 2 For every increasing function
Where
For the next theorem let σ (l) be the smallest sigma-algebra that makes l measurable. That is
It is well known that a function is σ (l) measurable if and only if it is a Borelean function composed with l.

Theorem 3 If ψ : [a, b]
→ R is measurable with respect to σ (l) then:
To prove this theorem we need some preliminary work.
Proposition 5 (i) Suppose φ (x−) < H (x−).
Then there exists a z * > x such that s (z) = l (z) = s (x−) whenever x < z < z * .
(ii) If φ (x) < H (x) then there is an interval [x, z * ) such that l (z) = l (x) for every z ∈ (x, z * ).
Proof: In the appendix
Proof of Theorem 3: Since σ (l) is generated by sets of the form {u; l (u) > λ}, λ ∈ R it suffices to prove that λ<l(u) dν(u) = λ<l(u) l(u)dF(u). The set {u; l (u) > λ} is an interval. First case:
In this case l(x * ) > λ and s(x * −) ≤ λ. Therefore φ(x * −) = H(x * −). QED We now collect the results above in our main technical result. 
The independent private values model
An object is to be sold at an auction with I bidders. The seller is risk neutral and wants to maximize expected revenue. Bidder i has a valuation s i with distribution . We have that:
The auction proceeds as follows: 
Remark 7
The payment p i (s) can be understood as the expected payment of a random paymentP i (s). This allows the inclusion of mixed strategy equilibria as in a first-price auction with discrete distribution of types.
The direct mechanism (q, p) has to satisfy incentive compatibility (IC) and voluntary participations (VP) constraints. That is, for every s i ,
The proof of the next two lemmas are identical to Myerson's (1981) proof and is omitted.
Thus the payment of bidder i is a function of Q i :
The voluntary participation constraint is true if and only if α i ≥ 0. To maximize revenue we set from now on α i = 0. Let ν i be the (signed) measure defined by
Thus we may rewrite the revenue as R i = Q i (x) dν i (x). Theorem 4 guarantees the existence of an increasing function l i :
Moreover we have equality if Q is σ (l i ) measurable.
We are now able to characterize the optimal auction. We define the allocation rule and the payment rule.
Definition 4 For each s ∈ S let H(s)
Definition 5 The payment of bidder i is for s ∈ S given by
Theorem 5 The optimal mechanism is (q, p) where p i is defined by (11) and q(s) = (q 1 (s) , . . . , q I (s)) by (10).
Proof: Let (q, p) be an incentive compatible, voluntary participation mechanism. From (9) we have that
The expected revenue is majored by:
Thus it suffices to prove that Q i (s i ) is increasing and that
Integrating in s −i we get Q i (s i ) ≥ Q i (s i ). Thus Q i (·) is increasing. And the equality (*) follows from the l i measurability of Q i . QED
We finish this section with an example.
Example 1 Suppose we have two bidders with valuations distributed as
This distribution has a jump of size 1/3 at u = 1. If ν is defined as in (8) the function
We omit the calculations that find
if 1 ≤ x ≤ √ 2 and φ = H otherwise. The virtual valuation is given by:
Let us compare the optimal revenue with the second-price revenue with reserve r = 1.
In contrast, the revenue in the optimal auction can be calculated as follows:
The function l i (·) generalizes Myerson's virtual valuation.
We now show that the function l i (·) obtained above coincides with the virtual valuation J i under condition (M). Recall that J i (x) is the derivative of the convex hull of the function H (x) = 
Application to a few classical results.
To show the wider applicability of the generalized virtual valuation we review how we can generalize a couple of classical results to distributions without density. We begin with nonlinear pricing.
Nonlinear pricing
In Mussa and Rosen (1978) the set of consumers types is given by an interval θ,θ and types are distributed according to a density f (θ). There is a monopolist who produces quality q at unit cost C(q). The monopolist's optimization problem is to choose an increasing product quality function q (θ) to maximize
Here, q (θ) is the quality level the monopolist intends a type θ to choose. The integral simplifies to
If we use the virtual valuation for a general distribution and signed measure
the analogous problem will be to choose an increasing function q (θ) to maximize
The functionq (θ) defined as the 11 solution of max q≥0 l (θ) q −C (q) is increasing.
and solves the original problem as well.
Regulation of a monopoly
In Baron and Myerson (1982) the virtual valuation has a different aspect. It has the form (see equation 16, page 917)
where the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the weight of the monopolist profit in the welfare maximization. For distributions without density we replace z α (θ) by the virtual valuation of the measure dν = θdF + (1 − α) F (θ) dθ.
Conclusion
We introduced a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. The virtual valuation can be interpreted as the "derivative" of the generalized convex hull. It is well adapted to characterize the optimal auction for distributions that are not absolutely continuous. It is an ironing procedure that is possible for any distribution. The continuity of the optimal auction revenue with respect to the distribution is easily proved using the generalized virtual valuation. This result, if restricted to distributions having densities is much less interesting. In particular, by dropping the density requirement, we are able to approximate a distribution by a discrete distribution maintaining proximity of optimal revenue as well.
We expect wider applicability of the generalized convex hull. For example we apply it to classical problems as in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Baron and Myerson (1982) .
A Proofs omitted in the text
We begin with the proof of Proposition 1 (basic properties):
There is a sequence (α n , β n ) ∈ Γ such that φ n := α n + β n F (x) converges to φ (x). Since α n ≤ 0 it is true that
. Thus since (φ n ) n is bounded so is (β n ) n . Therefore (α n ) n is bounded as well. Thus we may suppose without loss of generality that (α n , β n ) → (α , β ) ∈ Γ. From this we conclude that φ (x) = α + β F (x) ending the proof that
If β ≥ β * we have that (H (b) − β, β) ∈ Γ since for every z ≤ b, 0 then lim x↓a s (x) = −∞; Let x n ↓ a. We have that F (x n ) > 0 for every n so there exists (α n , β n ) ∈ Γ such that φ (x n ) = α n + β n F (x n ) . If (β n ) n is bounded without loss of generality β n → β * . Let (α, β) ∈ Γ , α +βF (x n ) ≤ α n +β n F (x n ) which implies that (α n ) n is bounded. Therefore α * + β * 0 ≥ α. Hence α * = 0. And (α * , β * ) ∈ Γ contradiction with Γ (a) = / 0. Since β n < β * necessarily β n → −∞. f) Suppose x < y. If F (x) = F (y) then l (x) = l (y). Suppose now that F (x) < F (y).
Let β ∈ ∂φ (x) and γ ∈ ∂φ (y). Then we have φ (y) − φ (x) ≥ β (F (y) − F (x)) and φ (x) − φ (y) ≥ γ (F (x) − F (y)) .
Adding the inequalities we have that 0 ≥ (β − γ) (F (y) − F (x)). Thus γ ≥ β and s (y) ≥ l (y) = inf {γ; γ ∈ ∂φ (y)} ≥ sup {β; β ∈ ∂φ (x)} = s (x) ≥ l (x) .
QED
Proof of Proposition 2: If F (x) = 1 there is nothing to prove. Consider now a ≤ x < b such that ∂φ (x) = / 0. Take a sequence x n ↓ x. Without loss of generality, F x 1 < 1.Then
This implies that lim n φ (x n ) = φ (x). Suppose now that x < b and ∂φ (x) = / 0. Then x = a and F (a) = 0. The inequality s (x 1 ) F (x n ) ≥ φ (x n )−φ (a) implies that φ (a) ≥ lim sup n φ (x n ). From the Proposition 1, item (c) there exists (α m , β m ) ∈ Γ such that α m → t a . Thus since α m + β m F (x n ) ≤ φ (x n ) we have that α m ≤ lim inf n φ (x n ) and finally making m goes to ∞ we conclude that φ (a) = t a ≤ lim inf n φ (x n ) ≤ lim sup n φ (x n ) ≤ φ (a) .
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that x n ↑ x. Thus if m = n + p and n ≥ n , l (x) (F (x m ) − F (x n )) ≥ φ (x m ) − φ (x n ) ≥ s (x n ) (F (x m ) − F (x n )) .
